Sabotage and Neutralization Activities in Moscow: A 2024 vs 2025 Analysis
How is the partisan movement organised around Russia's capital city
TLDR
The current article examines the impact of partisan activities in Moscow and the Moscow Oblast. The previously published article (August 2025) presented only partial findings. Now, thanks to completed research spanning 2024 and 2025, this study offers useful intelligence insights. The final results demonstrate that conventional partisan cells conduct sabotage operations in a reactive and adaptive way, while those focused on neutralization and neutralization attempts remained largely unaffected and operational throughout the analysed period. In other words: FSB antiterrorist operations have proven largely ineffective.
Background
Previously processed information laid the groundwork for useful intelligence insights, from which several hypotheses have been drawn. Partially recovered information (the first article was published in August 2025) lacked important data, making it mandatory to complete the analysis through the end of the year for those seeking useful intelligence about sabotage and neutralization operations in Moscow. Reading the first article is strongly recommended.
Thanks to the first published article, it’s clear a three-bubble structure is currently operating in Moscow and the Moscow region. Every bubble requires more layers of security than the previous one, with different types of intelligence required and more actions needed for their fulfilment.
The summer of 2025 finished with a slight decline in Bubble-1 (railway infrastructure, antennas, airfields and open-air facilities) and Bubble-2 (factories, malls, and all types of warehouses) activities. At the same time Bubble-3 activities (classical neutralization attempts) remained active. Thanks to this intelligence, it became clear the FSB “antiterrorist” campaigns had negative effects on partisan cells while neutralization operations remained largely unaffected. The following analysis will show some interesting changes regarding the adaptive nature of Bubble-1 and Bubble-2 operations.
What is happening
Data partially collected in 2023 and 2025 provide a partial picture of the true scope of partisan operations in Moscow and the surrounding areas. Intelligence processed during 2024 was the starting point and, thanks to completing the information gathered during 2025, several important insights have emerged. Most notably, neutralization attempts continued throughout the year.
The collected information also reveals different success among partisan cells conducting the most difficult operations inside Russia, and more specifically in Moscow. The main hypothesis about the existence of “partisan bubbles” classified according to their level of complexity has been confirmed. At the same time, most Bubble-3 partisan operations (neutralization attempts) suggest this type of disruptive activity is carried out by volunteers who are not linked to current sabotage cells. In other words, these are people motivated to carry out more risky operations despite their lack of experience in this domain. This hypothesis offers a plausible explanation for the varying outcomes of neutralization attempts.
Intelligence analysed during the last months reveals the true scope of partisan operations in 2025, but one should bear in mind the conclusions developed in our previous article published a few months ago. Some suspicious activities (like Anton Egotsev’s assassination or the “incident” involving an FSB member killed after an explosion in a shopping mall near the Lubyanka building) are currently in a grey area. It is worth noting information published on Russian Telegram channels was “mysteriously” deleted due to alleged “doxxing”.
Current research clearly shows the sustained readiness of Bubble-3 operations despite FSB attempts to suppress any type of sabotage or neutralization attempt. At the same time, Bubble-1 (the most established partisan cell) activities are not linked to Bubble-3. The patterns are clear over time, and their “wave-like nature” is perfectly exemplified in the graphs.
The slight decrease in Bubble-1 operations during 2025 is more or less clear if we categorize the attacked targets: this type of operation diminished in open-air facilities (airfields and railway infrastructure) where security was strengthened after the first waves of sabotage operations. During the same analysis period other Bubble-1 targets (antennas, garages, etc) rose due to the adaptive nature of partisan cells.
Filtered information shows Bubble-2 activities dropped in factories but expanded in warehouses. It’s important to consider HUMINT is probably more necessary for achieving this type of disruptive operation. Processed data shows Bubble-1 and Bubble-2 operations are clearly reactive to FSB countermeasures, while Bubble-3 operations have intensified their complexity despite an overall decrease in volume. The latter are currently more sophisticated.
If we segment data between sabotage activities and neutralizations (and neutralization attempts) we see clear patterns provide useful intelligence insights: In 2025, Bubble-3 activities remained consistent, while Bubble-1 and Bubble-2 showed waves. It should be noted most of the partisan operations need a process of gathering intelligence, designing future activities, and acquiring the necessary materials while attempting to evade the Putin regime’s radar.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn after analysing the processed data from 2024 and 2025. The strengthening of open-air facilities (mainly railway infrastructure and airfields) underscores the resilience of clandestine cells currently operating in Moscow and the surrounding areas, as evidenced by their shift towards new targets being attacked. Bubble-1 and Bubble-2 sabotage operations are clearly reactive to the crackdown on dissent and counterterrorist operations conducted primarily by the FSB.
It’s important to bear in mind the highly adaptive nature of Bubble-1 and Bubble-2 activities. This explains their relatively passive posture and is perfectly understandable for any sabotage group operating under an oppressive dictatorship. By contrast, Bubble-3 operations are not shaped by this reactivity and remain consistent (and active) amid most conventional partisan operations and their waves.
Putin’s regime is not only facing problems in stopping conventional elimination tactics on its own soil: FSB counterintelligence has proven ineffective in halting any type of disruptive activity in Russia’s capital. While 2025 ended with fewer neutralization attempts, those which occurred were more dangerous due to increased complexity and depth.